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A divisive law from the outset, the diminished responsibility defence has con-
tinued to arouse criticism since its inception over ¢¢ty years ago under section 2
of the HomicideAct1957. Increasing pressure from academics, practitioners, and
mental health professionals, among others, to restructure the law has resulted in
a reformulation of the wording of section 2 under the unassuming auspices of
section 52 of the Coroners and Justice Act 2009. This paper examines the new
de¢nition of diminished responsibility on two levels: the broader context and
structural signi¢cance of the Act and section 52’s place within it; and, the tech-
nical detail of the section itself. In so doing, consideration is given as towhether
the new law appeases the critics of the old, in addition to whether the Govern-
ment has succeeded in bringing to bear its objectives of clarity, fairness and
e¡ectiveness.
INTRODUCTION
The legislative de¢nition of diminished responsibility has been‘an easy target for
any critic’1 since its inception under section 2 of the Homicide Act 1957.2 Calls
for its reform have resonated for over half a century, with alternative drafts mate-
rialising from a miscellany of sources, most notably, the Butler Report,3
the Criminal Law Revision Committee,4 the Law Commission5 and several
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1 P. R. Glazebrook,‘Dealing withMentally Disordered O¡enders’ (1976) 35Cambridge LawJournal 9,12.
2 For example, Sparks opines that: ‘. . . it seems clear that, on balance, the practical e¡ects of section 2
to date have been unsatisfactory in certain respects; that these ill e¡ects would have been avoided if
the lawhad not been passed in its present form; and that there is nowayof insuring that theywill be
avoided in future, so long as the law remains as it now is,’ R. Sparks,‘Diminished Responsibility in
Theory and Practice’ (1964) 27MLR 9, 24. Griew is less sympathetic in his description of section 2,
which he calls ‘elliptical almost to the point of nonsense’, E. Griew, ‘Reducing Murder to Man-
slaughter: Whose Job?’ (1986) 12 J Med E 18, 19. For LadyWootton, the de¢nition is essentially
illogical, B.Wootton,‘Diminished Responsibility: A Layman’sView’ (1960) 76 LQR 224, 236.
3 Committee onMentallyAbnormal O¡enders, Report Cm 6244 (1975).
4 Criminal LawRevisionCommittee:O¡ences Against the Person, Fourteenth Report Cm 7844 (1980) at [93].
5 Partial Defences to Murder, Law Commission Report No 290 (2004) and Murder, Manslaughter and
Infanticide, Law Commission Report No 304 (2006).
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academic commentators.6 Discourse came to a head in November 2009, when the
partial defence became the most recent subject of what has been described as the
Government’s ‘protracted’7 review of the law of murder.
As a result, the de¢nition of diminished responsibility in England andWales
has been reformed signi¢cantly under the unlikely framework of the Coroners
and Justice Act 2009.8 Although largely concerned with reform of coroner law,
section 52 of theAct introduces replacement wording for diminished responsibil-
ity which, as wewill see, di¡ers considerably from the old law.The purpose of the
Act, in the particular context of its application to the criminal law, is to update the
latter in order to ‘improve its clarity, fairness and e¡ectiveness.’9 It is accepted that
such values are largely employed as guiding principles, with greater importance
naturally being attached to responding to long held criticisms in the area. That
said, consideration as to whether the Government has adequately applied such
values in its reshaping of the law, too, plays its part in an examination of the new
de¢nition of diminished responsibility.
Clarity, fairness and e¡ectiveness are worthy ideals in the criminal law. As Ash-
worth points out, principles based on clarity are essential to the rule of law,‘insofar
as they conduce to predictability, consistency and accountability in decision-mak-
ing.’10 Of course, such order is only of bene¢t if it aligns with the inherent legal
concept of fairness, particularly in terms of procedure, labelling and disposal. And
neither clarity nor fairness is of any real use if the criminal law is not e¡ective, or
capable of realising the objective it was implemented for.
To determine whether the Government’s approach under section 52 adheres to
the values so propounded, in addition towhether the critics have been answered,
this paper examines the potential impact of the new law in two respects. In the
¢rst instance, consideration is a¡orded to the context inwhich the criminal justice
element of theAct has emerged, in addition to the structure it has taken. Secondly,
an examination of the substantive content of section 52 of the Act will focus on
how the new law has replied to criticism of the old wording of the defence.
CONTEXTAND STRUCTUREOF CRIMINAL JUSTICE REFORM
UNDERTHE ACT
Changes to the law of diminished responsibility stem from a request by the
Home Secretary in 2003 for the Law Commission to consider and report on the
6 For example, R. D. Mackay, ‘Diminished Responsibility and Mentally Disordered Killers’ in
A. Ashworth and B. Mitchell (eds), Rethinking English Homicide Law (Oxford: OUP, 2000) 55.
7 Editorial,‘Adjusting the Boundaries of Murder: Partial Defences and Complicity’ [2008] Crim LR
829, 829.
8 The Act received Royal Assent on 12 November 2009. The Commencement Date for s 52 was 4
October 2010 (Commencement No.4). For a detailed review of the wording of the de¢nition, see
R. D. Mackay, ‘The Coroners and Justice Act 2009 ^ Partial Defences to Murder (2) The New
Diminished Responsibility Plea’ [2010] Crim LR 290.
9 Coroners and Justice Act 2009, Explanatory Notes at [14]. This echoes the Law Commission’s
emphasis on bringing‘order, fairness and clarity to the law of homicide’, Law Commission Report
(2006), n 5 above at [2.4].
10 A. Ashworth,‘Principles, Pragmatism and the LawCommission’s Recommendations onHomicide
Law Reform’ [2007] Crim LR 333, 344.
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law and practice of the partial defences to murder,11 in the particular context of
domestic violence. This resulted in the Law Commission’s report on Partial
Defences to Murder in 2004.12 The crux of the Commission’s recommendation in
relation to diminished responsibility was that, for as long as the law of murder
remains as it is, with conviction carrying a mandatory sentence of life imprison-
ment, the de¢nition under section 2(1) should remain unchanged.13 The Com-
mission opined that the de¢nition did not cause injustice and, as such, it would
be more appropriate to postpone reform of diminished responsibility until such
time as the Government tasks it with conducting a full review of the entire law
relating to murder, at which time partial defences could be considered from ¢rst
principles.14
In a promising development the Government did just that, with the result that
the Law Commission published a report onMurder,Manslaughter and Infanticide in
2006.15 The Report recommended that the HomicideAct1957 should be replaced
by a new Homicide Act for England andWales which would once and for all
provide coherent and comprehensive de¢nitions of homicide o¡ences and partial
defences.16 To restructure the o¡ences of homicide, the Law Commission recom-
mended a ‘ladder’ principle involving a hierarchy of graduated o¡ences existing
under the umbrella of homicide, which would re£ect the o¡ences’ degree of
seriousness.17 The o¡ences would therefore be split into two degrees of murder,
with the mandatory penalty restricted to ¢rst degree murder.18 The Law Com-
mission envisaged that diminished responsibility (together with gross provoca-
tion or fear of serious violence and participation in a suicide pact) would be
retained as a partial defence, with a successful plea having the e¡ect of reducing
¢rst degree murder to second degree murder.19 In terms of the substantive law of
diminished responsibility, it recommended that the de¢nition be modernised, so
that it would be both clearer and better able to accommodate developments in
expert diagnostic practice.20
11 Homicide Act 1957, s 2 (Diminished Responsibility) and s 3 (Provocation).
12 Law Commission Report (2004), n 5 above. For discussion see Editorial,‘Partial Defences to Mur-
der’ [2004] Crim LR1.
13 Law Commission Report (2004), n 5 above at [1.16].
14 It is only in the context of a full review that the Commission proposed a de¢nition of diminished
responsibility based on its prior consultation process. The Commission’s proposal received much
support from academic commentators. For example, see Editorial, , ‘Adjusting the Boundaries of
Murder: Partial Defences and Complicity’ [2008] 11Crim LR 829.
15 Law Commission Report (2006), n 5 above. For commentary on the Law Commission’s preceding
Consultation Paper, ANew HomicideAct for England andWales?, Consultation Paper No 177 (2005),
see: Editorial,‘Reviewing the Lawof Homicide’ [2006] Crim LR187;W.Wilson,‘The Structure of
Criminal Homicide’ [2006] Crim LR 471; A. Norrie,‘BetweenOrthodox Subjectivism andMoral
Contextualism: Intention and the Consultation Paper’ [2006] Crim L R 486; O Quick and C
Wells, ‘Getting Tough with Defences’ [2006] Crim L R 514; V. Tadros, ‘The Homicide Ladder’
(2006) 69 MLR 601.
16 Law Commission Report (2006), n 5 above at [1.63]. For further discussion see, Ashworth, above n
10, R. Taylor, ‘The Nature of ‘‘Partial Defences’’ and the Coherence of (Second Degree) Murder’
[2007] Crim LR 345.
17 Law Commission Report (2006), n 5 above at [1.64].
18 Law Commission Report (2006), n 5 above at [1.67].
19 Law Commission Report (2006), n 5 above at [5.83].
20 Law Commission Report (2006), n 5 above at [5.107].
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Yet, the Law Commission’s proposal went largely unheeded by the Govern-
ment in its subsequent consultation paper.21 Here, the Government accepted
the basic premise that the partial defence of diminished responsibility should
be retained but reformed, and broadly agreedwith the Commission’s recommen-
dations on how this should be done. However, it did so in the context of the
existing structure of murder law, despite the fact that the Law Commission’s
recommendations were predicated on their proposed new homicide o¡ence
structure.22 Indeed, the paper states that ‘the wider recommendations in the
LawCommission’s reportmaybe considered at a later stage of the review’ (emphasis
added). However, the fact that the Government has engaged in solely
amending the partial defences, suggests that it will be some time before the
o¡ence structure is reformed: ‘. . . it would make no sense at all to adjust the outer
boundaries of murder at this stage, as the [Government consultation paper] pro-
poses to do, if the whole map might be redrawn later. It is a sad fate for a good
proposal.’23
The Government’s departure from the Law Commission’s proposals has been
defended on the basis that the latter were ‘somewhat radical’ and ‘did not com-
mand total agreement between all stakeholders and users of the system’.24 As a
result, the Government was apparently unable to come to a consensus that led it
to believe that it should proceedwith the‘full panoplyof restructuring the o¡ence
as well as splitting it up’ at that time.25 Although indication was given that there
will be a second stage to the Government’s considerations about whether to go
forward with some of the other proposals in the Law Commission’s report, as it
stands, the position is not ideal.
Turning to the structure of the Act, unsurprisingly, much of it is dedicated to
the reform of coroner law and procedure. A more fragmentary approach is given
to the ‘justice’ element of the Act. In addition to reforming the law of diminished
responsibility, the Act also amends the law of provocation and the law of assisted
21 Murder, Manslaughter and Infanticide: Proposals for Reform of the Law, Ministry of Justice Consultation
Paper CP19/08 (2008). For discussion see Editorial, , ‘Adjusting the Boundaries of Murder: Partial
Defences and Complicity’ [2008] 11Crim LR 829.
22 Ministry of Justice Consultation Paper (2008), ibid. at [9].
23 Editorial,‘Adjusting the Boundaries of Murder: Partial Defences and Complicity’ [2008] 11Crim
L R 829, 829. David Howarth, (then MP), echoes this sentiment when referring to the Coroners
and Justice Bill 2009: ‘Unfortunately, the Government have [sic] changed the reformed defences
from the Law Commission’s work and have put the narrower versions of the defences into the Bill
without having reformed the law of murder itself, and it is arguable that that makes no sense at all.
The Government need to come backwith a complete reform.’Coroners and Justice Bill, HCPublic
Bill Committee col 409 3 March 2009.
24 Maria Eagle (then Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Justice), Coroners andJustice Bill, HC
Public Bill Committee col 413 3 March 2009.
25 ibid.The Government’s o⁄cial response to its failure to implement the full Law Commission pro-
posals reads as follows:
The Law Commission’s recommendations for this important and sensitive area of law are
ambitious and wide-ranging; it is critical that we get this right and sowe have proceeded on a
staged basis.We will be looking at the Commission’s other recommendations, in particular
those for a new structure for homicide and complicity to murder, in due course, in the light
of the e¡ect of any changes arising from this stage of the work.
Murder,Manslaughterand Infanticide: Proposals forReform of theLaw, Summaryof Responses andGov-
ernment Position, Ministry of Justice Responses to Consultation CP(R) 19/08 (2009) at [120].
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suicide,26 introduces newmeasures in relation to child pornographyo¡ences, data
sharing, and legal aid, and much more.27 Whether it is the most appropriate fra-
mework for dealing with important changes to the law of homicide, then, is
questionable.
Homicide law in England andWales has been described by the Law Commis-
sion as ‘misleading, out-of-date, un¢t for purpose, or all of these.’28 To address this
criticism bydealing with one element of the lawonly, in an Act concernedwith a
dense compilation of other, unrelated matters, does not inspire clarity in law.The
means by which the law of homicide has been amended in this Act is arguably
un¢t for purpose, in that it fails to address systematically the entirety of the law
of homicide.
It is suggested that instead of appending important reforms to murder law to
what has been described as a ‘gargantuan’29 Act dealing with all manner of crim-
inal, procedural and administrative law, it would bemore appropriate to construct
a separate Act whichwould address the necessary reforms to the law of homicide,
notwithstanding the delay that this would inevitably bring. Indeed, the fact that
this has not occurred suggests to one commentator that the substantive law of
murder will not be reformed any time soon, if at all.30
A related point concerns the lack of adequate consideration having been
a¡orded to the relationship between diminished responsibility and insanity, given
that both are concernedwith issues of mental disorder, together with the fact that
the law relating to the latter is currently under review by the Law Commission.31
A more appropriate process of reform would see a re-evaluation of the criminal
law at all the points at which itmeets issues relating tomental disorder, in order to
ensure consistency and fairness in processes dealing with o¡enders with mental
disorders. An example of such an approach in practice can be seen in Ireland,
where the law relating to un¢tness to plead, insanity and diminished responsibil-
ity was the subject of a synchronised reformulation under the Criminal Law
(Insanity) Act 2006.32
It is a moot point as to whether the guiding principles set out by the Govern-
ment apply to the sca¡olding of the law. If one accepts that they do, the question
must be asked as towhether they have been adequately taken into account in this
instance. A piecemeal approach to reforming the law of homicide by merely
26 Coroners and Justice Act 2009, ss 52^56.
27 See Editorial, ‘The Coroners and Justice Act 2009’ [2010] Crim L R 1, 1^2, which summarises the
subject matter of each of the seven parts of the Act.
28 Law Commission Report (2006), n 5 above at [1.70].
29 J. Miles, ‘The Coroners and Justice Act 2009: a ‘‘Dog’s Breakfast’’ of Homicide Reform’ (2009) 10
Arch News 6, 6.
30 Editorial,‘Adjusting the Boundaries of Murder: Partial Defences and Complicity’ [2008] 11Crim
LR 829, 829.
31 Tenth Programme of LawReform, Law Commission No 311 (2008^2011), Project 7: Un¢tness to Plead
and the Insanity Defence. The Law Commission opines that ‘. . . there is a need to reconsider the
relationship between . . . diminished responsibility and insanity’ at [1.20].
32 For further discussion of the Irish experience, see D.Whelan, ‘The Criminal Law (Insanity) Act
2006’ in T. J. McIntyre, K. Spencer and D.Whelan, Criminal Legislation Annotated 2006 ^ 2007
(Dublin:Thomson Round Hall, 2008); D.Whelan,Mental Health Lawand Practice (Dublin: Round
Hall, 2009), ch16; G. Coonan and B. Foley,TheJudge’s Charge inCriminalTrials (Dublin: RoundHall,
2008), ch 16.
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addressing the partial defences in an Act dedicated to a multiplicity of matters is
ine¡ective and unclear, in the sense that it fails to take into account the broader
contextual recommendations of the Law Commission, in addition to how the
criminal law relates comprehensively to o¡enders with mental disorders. Albeit
a step in the right direction, it remains to be seenwhether the reformulation of the
defences in isolation does more harm than good; particularly in light of the fact
that, notwithstanding its ambiguous and archaic nature, the original de¢nition of
diminished responsibility has worked well in practice.33
SUBSTANTIVE CONTENTOF SECTION 52 OF THE ACT
Section 2(1) of the Homicide Act 1957 provided that:
[w]here a person kills or is a party to the killing of another, he shall not be convicted
of murder if he was su¡ering from such abnormality of mind (whether arising
from a condition of arrested or retarded development of mind or any inherent
causes or induced by disease or injury) as substantially impaired his mental respon-
sibility for his acts or omissions in doing or being a party to the killing.
Under the original de¢nition, then, there existed two basic requirements in order
to bring a successful plea of diminished responsibility. In the ¢rst instance, the
accused must have been su¡ering from an ‘abnormality of mind’, and secondly,
that abnormality must have ‘substantially impaired his mental responsibility for
the killing’.The defence has been interpreted by the courts to cover a wide range
of mental conditions,34 including psychopathy, volitional insanity and alcohol-
ism.35 The scope of the defence alsowent so far as to include the mercy-killer.36
Although naturally overlapping principles, the next section addresses the var-
ious criticisms pertaining to diminished responsibility under the headings of
clarity and fairness. E¡ectiveness is also considered but to a lesser extent.The dis-
cussion is not restricted to these headings, but their use serves the purpose of
keeping in mind the Government’s goals when considering the criticisms of the
old law.
Issues pertaining to clarity
The primary grievance with the old de¢nition is its lack of clarity in relation to
two aspects of its phraseology. Firstly, the term ‘abnormality of mind’ (and the
bracketed aetiological causes) which has been deemed obscure and inadequate in
33 O. Quick and C.Wells,‘GettingToughwith Defences’ [2006] Crim LR 514, 520.
34 R. D. Mackay,‘The abnormality of mind factor in diminished responsibility’ [1999] Crim LR117,
117.
35 For further discussion on the accession and practical application of diminished responsibility in
England andWales under the original de¢nition, see E. E. Tennant,The Future of the Diminished
Responsibility Defence toMurder (Chichester: Barry Rose, 2001).
36 For discussion in this context see, G.Williams,Textbook of Criminal Law (London: Stevens, 2nd ed,
1983) 693; E. Griew,‘The Future of DiminishedResponsibility’ [1988] Crim LR 75, 79^80; A. Ash-
worth, Principles of Criminal Law (Oxford: OUP, 2009).
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a medical diagnostic sense; and secondly, ‘substantial impairment of mental
responsibility’ which also throws up de¢nitional issues. Section 52 of the Cor-
oners and Justice Act responds to these criticisms by introducing a revised partial
defence of diminished responsibility based on the concept of a ‘recognised medi-
cal condition’ with the objective of spelling out more clearly what aspects
of a defendant’s functioning must be a¡ected in order for the partial defence to
succeed.37
Section 52 replaces the wording of section 2(1) of the Homicide Act 1957 with
the following, which if pleaded successfully, has the e¡ect of reducing a convic-
tion of murder to one of manslaughter:
(1)Aperson (‘D’)whokills or is aparty to the killingof another is not tobe convict ed
of murder if D was su¡ering from an abnormality of mental functioning which ^
(a) arose from a recognised medical condition,
(b) substantially impaired D’s ability to do one or more of the things mentioned in
subsection (1A), and
(c) provides an explanation for D’s acts and omissions in doing or being a party to
the killing.
(1A) Those things are ^
(a) to understand the nature of D’s conduct;
(b) to form a rational judgment;
(c) to exercise self-control.
(1B) For the purposes of subsection (1)(c), an abnormality of mental functioning
provides an explanation for D’s conduct if it causes, or is a signi¢cant contributory
factor in causing, D to carry out that conduct.
Although responding to the criticisms regarding a lack of clarity, as Mackay
points out, the new wording introduces its own complications, for example, the
addition of a causation requirement, to the e¡ect that the abnormality should
cause or be a signi¢cant contributory factor in causing the defendant to kill.38
The new phraseology will now be considered in further detail.
‘Abnormality of Mental Functioning’Arising from a ‘RecognisedMedical Condition’
The original phrase‘abnormalityofmind’together with the bracketed aetiological
causes which follow it,39 are not psychiatric terms, and so their meaning has had
to be developed by the courts from case to case. It is arguable, therefore, that the
result of this de¢nition has been a lack of consistency in the law, a criticismwhich
the Government has sought to redress with the more meticulous wording of sec-
tion 52.Yet, in practice the bracketed causes, though outmoded, infrequently used
37 Ministry of Justice Consultation Paper (2008), n 21 above, 2.
38 R. D. Mackay, ‘The Coroners and Justice Act 2009 ^ Partial Defences to Murder (2) The New
Diminished Responsibility Plea’ [2010] Crim LR 290, 293.
39 ‘[A] condition of arrested or retarded development of mind or any inherent causes or induced by
disease or injury’.
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and without an agreed psychiatric meaning, have facilitated £exible interpreta-
tion.40 However, although the LawCommission acknowledged that thewording
was not causing an injustice, it expressed concern that diagnostic practice in
diminished responsibility cases has long since developed beyond identi¢cation
of the narrow range of causes of an abnormality of mind, a point with which
the Government agreed.41
Under section 52, the somewhat nebulous ‘abnormality of mind’ has been
replaced by the phrase‘abnormalityofmental functioning’. (Curiously, this comes
at a time when the ‘abnormality of mind’phrase has been enshrined into Scottish
legislation).42 The bracketed words have been removed and replaced with the
term ‘recognised medical condition’. The e¡ect is that the law is no longer con-
strained by the ¢xed set of causes fromwhich an abnormality ofmental function-
ing must stem. Instead, the issue is whether the abnormality was brought about
by a ‘recognised medical condition’. The Royal College of Psychiatrists has sup-
ported this change:
The presence of such a restriction . . . would ensure that any such defence was
grounded in valid medical diagnosis. It would also encourage reference within
expert evidence to diagnosis in terms of one or two of the accepted internationally
classi¢catory systems of mental conditions (WHO ICD10 and AMA DSM) with-
out explicitly writing those systems into the legislation . . . Such an approachwould
also avoid individual doctors o¡ering idiosyncratic ‘diagnoses’ as the basis for a plea
of diminished responsibility.43
Thus, in practice, it is likely that psychiatric classi¢catory systems will play amore
central role in establishing the existence of a recognised medical condition result-
ing in an abnormality of mental functioning. Of course, most diagnoses by
experts under the original de¢nition would have had some recognised medical
basis. The new wording, however, makes this requirement essential, so in that
respect, it clari¢es the law. But this change in de¢nitionmay havemore far-reach-
ing consequences than initially anticipated. Accepting that it has not yet been
40 R. D. Mackay,‘The Abnormality of Mind Factor in Diminished Responsibility’ [1999] Crim LR
117, 117. Elsewhere, Mackay discusses how court report writers have frequently failed to consider
the bracketed causes, with the result that the majority of reports did not discuss the aetiological
causes of the defendant’s abnormality of mind, see Law Commission Report (2004), n 5 above,
Appendix B,Table 18,156.
41 Law Commission Report (2006), n 5 above at [5.111].
42 Criminal Justice and Licensing (Scotland) Act 2010, s 168, provides that the following de¢nition be
inserted into the Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995 at s 51B:
(1) A person whowould otherwise be convicted of murder is instead to be convicted of culp-
able homicide on grounds of diminished responsibility if the person’s ability to determine or
control conduct forwhich the personwould otherwise be convicted ofmurder was, at the time
of the conduct, substantially impaired by reason of abnormality of mind.(2) For the avoidance
of doubt, the reference in subsection (1) to abnormality of mind includes mental disorder.
This reformulation of the law follows from the Scottish Law Commission’s report on Insanity and
Diminished Responsibility, Scottish Law Commission Report No 195 (2004), which recommended
that the decision inGalbraithvHMAdvocate 2002 JC1be implemented as a statutory de¢nition in
the form of a plea in mitigation in cases of murder. See further, J. Chalmers and F. Leverick,
Criminal Defences and Pleas in Bar ofTrial (Edinburgh:WGreen, 2006).
43 Law Commission Report (2006), n 5 above at [5.114].
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interpreted by the courts, the term‘recognised medical condition’, as it stands, has
the e¡ect of narrowing the defence of diminished responsibility by excluding
those disorders which may no longer or may not yet be accepted internationally
as ‘medical conditions’.
The original de¢nition had progressed to the point where it was interpreted by
the courts to show leniency to a ‘highly stressed killer’, in the sense that a defen-
dant could receive a manslaughter verdict if the particular form of stress in ques-
tionwas pathologised as diminished responsibility.44 This trend is also re£ected in
prominent domestic violence cases of the early 1990s featuring the controversial
‘BatteredWoman’s Syndrome’.45 Such forms of interpretation have been described
as a‘benign conspiracy’46 which stretched the notion of ‘abnormality of mind’, to
enable a verdict to meet the perceived justice of the case.47 The restriction of the
law to internationally medically recognised and documented conditions brings
the possibility of a defendant (for example a ‘mercy-killer’) being convicted of
murder and given a mandatory life sentence, despite his or her responsibility for
the killing being far removed from‘the gangland executioner and the serial killer
who likes to torture his victims ¢rst’.48
So although the introduction of ‘recognised medical condition’may promote
the principle of clarity, conversely, it draws into question the fairness of the situa-
tion for the o¡ender pleading diminished responsibility. Should both the court
and the expert utilise a strict interpretation of the phrase, the likelihood of a
‘mercy killer’ being brandished a ‘murderer’ and sentenced to life imprisonment
increases.Thus, the new law of diminished responsibility has a potentially dama-
ging impact on a particular group of o¡enders who could have availed of the par-
tial defence under the original de¢nition.
44 Editorial,‘Adjusting the Boundaries of Murder: Partial Defences and Complicity’ [2008] 11Crim
LR 829, 830.
45 See, RvAhluwalia [1992] 4 All ER 889 and RvThornton [1992] 1All ER 306. Defences of provoca-
tion failed in both cases; however diminished responsibility defences were successful at retrial.
What is evident is the medicalisation of the experience of these women rather than an acknowl-
edgement of the broader political, social and economic contexts of violence in a domestic setting.
For an interesting discussion, see the Victorian Law Reform Commission’s report on Defences to
Homicide: Final Report,Victorian Law Reform Commission Report (2004) and M. Donnelly,‘Bat-
teredWomenwho Kill and the Criminal Law Defences’ (1993) Irish Criminal LawJournal 161.
46 Law Commission Report (2004), n 5 above at [2.34].
47 See the written evidence of the British Humanist Association (BHA), ‘Coroners and Justice Bill:
Memorandum’, Ev 37, in Human Rights Joint Committee, Legislative Scrutiny: Coroners and Justice
Bill, Eighth Report HL Paper 57, HC 362 (2009).The BHA, although not endorsing the ‘benign
conspiracy’ or ‘mercy killing’, makes the point that ‘mercy killings’ are taking place, and it is neces-
sary that the law addresses these cases appropriately. It expresses concern that the revised de¢nition
of diminished responsibility will make the situationworse for genuine‘mercy killers’ and seriously
impact upon their human rights.See also, A. Ashworth, Principles ofCriminal Law (Oxford:OUP, 5th
ed, 2006) at 283; B. Mitchell, ‘Public Perceptions of Homicide and Criminal Justice’ (1998) 38 B J
Crim 453, 460.; S. Dell,Murder intoManslaughter (Oxford: OUP,1984) 35^6, Dell identi¢es some10
caseswhich have amercy killing element within the research period.Mackay’smore recent studyof
157 cases in which diminished responsibility was raised, suggests that six were probably cases of
mercy killing, see R. D. Mackay,‘The Diminished Responsibility Plea in Operation ^ An Empirical
Study’, in Law Commission Report (2004), n 5 above, Appendix B.
48 Editorial,‘Adjusting the Boundaries of Murder: Partial Defences and Complicity’ [2008] 11Crim
LR 829, 830.
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Timewill tell how the system responds to this particular circumstance in practice.
It maywell be the case that the courtswill likewise stretch their interpretation of the
term‘recognisedmedical condition’, or the experts their diagnoses, in order to enable
the ‘benign conspiracy’ to continue, albeit in a slightly di¡erent guise.49 Should this
be the case, whether or not the clarity of the law relating to diminished responsibil-
ity has been improved by section 52 would be brought into question.
DeterminingMental Responsibility
ProfessorAshworth speaks for the majority when he opines that the old wording
of section 2(1) is clumsy when it refers to ‘impairing mental responsibility’.50 He
maintains that the de¢nition should, in fact, refer to the substantial impairment of
the defendant’s capacity, which, in turn, is re£ected in his reduced culpability at
sentencing in the form of a discounted conviction from murder to manslaugh-
ter.51 Section 52 seeks to address this criticism by clarifying what impact on capa-
city the e¡ects of an abnormality of mental functioning must have, if the
abnormality is to be the basis for a successful plea.52 It does so by seeking to
expand the meaning of what is termed ‘mental responsibility’ under the original
de¢nition, without incorporating that phraseology into the new law. Section 52
sets out the following capacities, the absence of one or more of which, go to the
substantial impairment of the defendant’s mental functioning: to understand the
nature of his or her conduct, to form a rational judgment, and to exercise self-
control.
Whilst the Law Commission claims that under this recommendation, there
will remain an important theoretical distinction between the insanity plea and
the plea of diminished responsibility,53 this de¢nition is, in part, very similar to
the insanity defence.54 In terms of cognition, the same test is applied in relation to
49 For example, see Quick andWells who surmise that: ‘In practice, the de¢nition of the defence is in
the hands of expert witnesses, whose sympathies understandably rest with defendants struggling
with various mental states and the spectre of the mandatory life sentence for murder’, Quick and
Wells, above n 33, 520.
50 A. Ashworth, Principles of Criminal Law (Oxford: OUP, 5th ed, 2006) 279.
51 ibid 279. See also Sparks’ comments in respect of ‘mental responsibility’:
. . . the section is quite intelligible if (but, it is submitted, only if ) ‘mental responsibility’ is taken
to refer to the mental capacitywhich is morally a necessary condition of legal responsibility (in
the sense of liability to punishment). On this interpretation the sectionwould substitute a ver-
dict of manslaughter for one of murder, thus providing for mitigation of punishment, if the
accused’s mental capacity to control his conduct so as to conform to the law was ‘substantially
impaired’ bymental disorder.This is, of course, the substance of the Scottish doctrine onwhich
the section is based . . . on this interpretation, it is submitted that it cannot, in these or anyother
terms, be reconciled with our usual moral and legal principles: since according to these it is
never appropriate to base mere mitigation of punishment on mental incapacity.
R. Sparks,‘Diminished Responsibility inTheory and Practice’ (1964) 27 MLR 9, 26.
52 Law Commission Report (2006), n 5 above at [5.121].
53 ibid at [5.114].
54 The insanitydefence in England andWales, although currently under reviewby the LawCommis-
sion, remains governed by the M’Naghten Rules, as a result of controversy following the case of
Daniel M’Naghten (1843) 10 Cl and Fin 200. According to the M’Naghten Rules it must be estab-
lished that cognitive incapacity,‘defect of reason’was caused by a‘disease of the mind’, such that the
defendant did not to know the nature and quality of the act hewas doing; or, if he did know it, that
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insanity and diminished responsibility; it is just the degree of the understanding
that is judged. There exists, however, an additional volitional element to the
diminished responsibility de¢nition, which was elucidated in the decision in Rv
Byrne.55 At the appellate stage of this case, Lord Parker CJ held that the term‘men-
tal responsibility’ is:
. . . wide enough to cover the mind’s activities in all its aspects, not only the percep-
tion of physical acts and matters, and the ability to form a rational judgement as to
whether an act is right or wrong, but also the ability to exercise will-power to control his
physical acts in accordance with that rational judgment.56
Section 52 incorporates the Byrne criteria into the legislative de¢nition of the law,
which is a sensible elucidation, and certainly a clari¢cation of what is required by
the notion of ‘mental responsibility’. The primary issue with the Byrne criteria
which section 52 fails to clarify, however, is the ‘irresistible impulse’ element, in
that the di⁄culties and uncertainties which deterred judges from allowing the
irresistible impulse defence under the M’Naghten Rules in the ¢rst place, still
remain.57 As Lord Parker CJ opined: ‘[T]he step between ‘‘he did not resist his
impulse’’ and ‘‘he could not resist his impulse’’ is . . . one which is incapable of
scienti¢c proof . . . there is no scienti¢c measurement of the degree of di⁄culty
which an abnormal person ¢nds in controlling his impulses.’58
The section also fails to address the ambiguity that has surrounded the mean-
ing of the term ‘substantially impaired’ under the original de¢nition, a phrase
which has been reincarnated under section 52. There is evidence of judicial con-
fusion as to what ‘substantial’ amounts to. It is clear that it requires more than‘tri-
vial or minimal’ impairment,59 or moderate impairment,60 but does not have to
amount to borderline insanity.61Although a pragmatic approach is taken in prac-
tice, it is surprising that the Government did not avail of the opportunity to
delineate this phrase, given its objective of clari¢cation.
he did not knowhewas doingwhatwaswrong.This echoes Coroners and JusticeAct 2009, s 52(1A)
(a) and (b).
55 [1960] 2 QB 396. (Byrnewas followed inRose vR [1961] AC 496, PC,RvTerry [1961] 2 QB 314; 45 Cr
App R180, CCA, RvGomez [1964] 48 CrApp R 310, CCA).
56 ibid 404, (Lord Parker CJ) emphasis added. The direction in Byrne was expressly approved inTerry,
where the Court of Appeal held that the trial judge was required to provide the jury with a proper
interpretation of the terms of section 2 as per Byrne, and that to merely read aloud the section was
unacceptable.
57 D. Ormerod, Smith and Hogan Criminal Law (Oxford: OUP,12th ed, 2008). For an earlier discussion
on irresistible impulse in the context of diminished responsibility, see J. E. HallWilliams,‘Irresis-
tible Impulse and Diminished Responsibility’ (1961) 24 MLR 164.
58 [1960] 3 All ER1, 5 (Lord Parker CJ).
59 Rv Lloyd [1967] 1QB175 at 180, applied in Rv R [2010] EWCACrim194.
60 Rv Simcox [1964] Crim LR 402, considered in Rv R, ibid.
61 Rv Seers [1984] 79 Cr. App. Rep. 261 at 264. Rv Lloyd, n 59 above, 50 CrApp R 61 at 64, CCA, the
court approved the following direction on the words ‘substantially impaired’ given by the trial
judge:
Substantial does not mean total, that is to say the mental responsibility need not be totally
impaired, so to speak, destroyed altogether. At the other end of the scale substantial does not
mean trivial or minimal. It is something in between and Parliament has left it to you . . . to say
on the evidence: was the mental responsibility impaired, and, and if so, was it substantially
impaired?
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The Causation Requirement
The Government chose to endorse the Law Commission’s recommendation that
the abnormality of mind element must be shown to be ‘an explanation’ for the
defendant’s conduct, thus ensuring that there is an appropriate connection
between the abnormality of mental functioning and the killing.62 The original
de¢nition simply stated that the abnormality of mind must substantially impair
the defendant’s mental responsibility for his acts in doing or being a party to the
killing.63 This particular amendment seeks to tackle the criticism that it has never
been entirely clear whether, under the existing law, the abnormality of mind
must, in some sense,‘cause’ the defendant to kill.64
While certainly resolving the question as towhether causation is a requirement
of a successful diminished responsibility defence, the de¢nition fails to shed any
light on the di⁄culties inherent in proving the link between the defendant’s con-
duct and the abnormality of mental functioning. Furthermore, even if the causal
element could be proven,Wilson makes a point which brings into question its
fairness.65 He highlights the ‘rigorous and precise’ nature of the new law, particu-
larly in the context of the causal requirement.66 Because of this, he maintains, it is
a strange conclusion to draw that the diminished responsibility defendant may be
held responsible for the killing, in the sameway as a defendant with normal men-
tal functioning who kills with the intention to do serious injury or with reckless
indi¡erence.67 The ‘fairness’ (or lack thereof ) in this scenario clearly goes to the
issue of labelling, which is dealt with in further detail below.
Issues pertaining to fairness
This section addresses more general criticisms of the law of diminished responsi-
bility which, though not dealt with expressly in the newde¢nition, are nonethe-
less relevant. Such criticisms come under the umbrella of fairness. Therefore, a
detailed review of the concept itself stretches beyond the remit of this paper,68
62 LawCommissionReport (2006), n 5 above at [5.124]. See also the statement of Maria Eagle: ‘We do
not believe that the partial defence should succeedwhere randomcoincidence has brought together
the activity of the person and the recognised medical condition.’ HC Public Bill Committee, n 24
above, col 416.
63 Law Commission Report (2006), n 5 above at [5.122].
64 See Byrne [1960] 3WLR 440, 443^444: ‘The expression‘‘mental responsibility for his acts’’points to
consideration of the extent to which the accused’s mind is answerable for his physical acts, which
must include a consideration of the extent of his ability to exercise will-power to control his
physical acts.’
65 W.Wilson, ‘The Structure of Criminal Homicide’ [2006] Crim L R 471, 483. AlthoughWilson
discusses the Law Commission’s de¢nition, the point remains applicable to section 52.
66 ibid.
67 ibid.
68 For theoretical discussions on fairness in the context of the criminal law see, for example, R. A.
Du¡, Answering for Crime: Responsibility and Liability in the Criminal Law, (Oxford: Hart Publishing,
2007); V. Tadros, ‘Attribution, Ethics and Emotions in Criminal Responsibility’ (2004) 67 MLR
322.; N.Walker, Punishment, Danger and Stigma:The Morality of Criminal Justice (Oxford: Blackwell,
1980); G. P. Fletcher,The Grammar of Criminal Law (Oxford: OUP, 2007); J. Gardner, ‘The Gist of
Excuses’ (1998) 1Bu¡alo Criminal LawReview 575..
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however, it is dealt with in brief under the headings of procedural fairness and fair
labelling.
Procedural Fairness
This section utilises Gardner’s meaning of procedural fairness, rather than proce-
dural fairness in the strict sense of the relative ability of each side of the adversarial
process to argue their case. Gardner looks for fairness in the process of the defen-
dant’s opportunity to provide ‘structured explanatory dialogue’ in a public set-
ting.69 He identi¢es a ‘basic responsibility’ which is represented in the criminal
process by the ability of an individual to explain their position rationally.70 Thus,
for Gardner,‘this point is not a point relative towhich the procedure is instrumental;
rather the point is in the procedure.’71
It follows that procedural fairness can be found in one’s ability or oppor-
tunity to explain oneself to a jury in a trial setting. How does the plea of
diminished responsibility fare, then, if we apply Gardner’s approach to it in
a practical sense? The reality is that the majority of diminished responsibility
cases do not reach the trial stage,72 largely due to the prevalence and weight
a¡orded to psychiatric reports.73 With the introduction of the requirement of a
‘recognised medical condition’, it is possible that the cases will become more
mechanical in terms of deciding who does and does not qualify for a successful
plea. However, procedurally, this could result in even more defendants who plead
diminished responsibility being deprived of their rational explanation of self
in public.
There is another line of argument which suggests that, as ideal as a trial by jury
may seem, in more di⁄cult cases, particularly involving expert evidence, the
jury is simply unable to deal with the questions put before it.74 So rather than
69 J. Gardner,‘The Mark of Responsibility’ (2003) 23 OJLS 157,167.
70 ibid 166 and 171.
71 ibid 167.
72 R. D. Mackay,‘The Diminished Responsibility Plea in Operation ^ An Empirical Study’ in Law
Commission Report (2004), n 5 above, Appendix B. During the research period (1997^2001) there
had been a total of 157 defendants where diminished responsibility was identi¢ed as a defence
which was raised during the course of the trial process.There was no jury trial in 77.1% (n5121)
of the cases. See alsoT. Hardie S. Elcock and R. D. Mackay, ‘Are Psychiatrists a¡ecting the Legal
Process by answering Legal Questions?’ (2008) 18 Criminal Behaviour andMental Health 117,126.:
The data strongly suggest that pleas are being accepted without a trial in the majority of cases,
which re£ects previous work . . . It is possible that the cases that go to trial are the ones for
which there is properly genuine doubt about the appropriateness of the plea, and that the court
is correctly avoiding wasting resources with unnecessary and expensive hearings for those that
do not go to trial.
73 As it stands, research indicates that psychiatrists frequently answer the legal question of diminished
responsibility, see Hardie et al, ibid128, where half (169) of the psychiatric reports analysed between
1997^2001gave a clear opinion on diminished responsibility, a third (121) invited the court to draw
a particular conclusion and11per cent (36) provided relevant evidence without answering the legal
questions.When there was an opinion or an invitation to make a ¢nding on the legal question, a
trial was less likely. A trial was also less likely if the psychiatric reports agreed on what the verdict
should be.
74 For example, LadyWootton has gone so far as to describe the burden laid upon the jury in this
regard as ‘improper’, and remarks that: ‘they are required to answer questions which are not only
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usurping the role of the jury,75 the expert is assisting the jury in coming to a
decision; bringing its own complications. It is impossible to get inside the mind
of the individual at the time of the o¡ence, even for psychiatrists, therefore juries
are being asked to base their decision on opinion, which usually involves choos-
ing between two di¡ering views.
In Rv Cannings,76 Judge LJ goes so far as towarn that ‘. . . if the outcome of the
trial depends exclusively or almost exclusively on a serious disagreement between
distinguished and reputable experts, it will often be unwise, and therefore unsafe,
to proceed.’77 This is largely due to the fact that as psychiatrists give opinion evi-
dence, it is likely that one expert’s opinion of the facts will di¡er from the other.78
However, place this argument in the hands of the jury, and further di⁄culties
arise. Juries will be quite unfamiliar with the technical language used by forensic
psychiatrists, and as Blom-Cooper andMorris point out, this can be bewildering,
not least when it is presented for many hours, and over many days.79
It appears, therefore, that the question as to who decides what in terms of the
mental condition and criminal responsibility of the accused remains unclear,
despite the goal of clari¢cation underpinning the new law.What is clear, however,
is that the system in place, which sees psychiatrists testifying in relation to respon-
sibility, and juries attempting to decipher complicated psychiatric terminology,
results in ambiguity, inconsistency and thus arguably unfair treatment of the
mentally disordered o¡ender.
Fair Labelling
Turning to fairness in the broader context of labelling, the term is a complicated
one, as is demonstrated by the writings of Chalmers and Leverick.80 They point
to the fact that there is a strong argument (incidentally one that they do not agree
with) that fair labelling does not apply to the defences at all.81However, as a partial
defence, diminished responsibility is in anunusual position as, if pleaded successfully,
it has the unique e¡ect of altering a charge of murder to one of manslaughter.Thus,
there is a strong argument that the notion of fair labelling is applicable to diminished
responsibility as a partial defence.
beyond the competence of experts, but are by their very nature unanswerable by anybody . . .’
Wootton, n 2 above, 236.
75 For discussion on the ‘ultimate issue’ rule which has traditionally prevented the use of expert evi-
dence in relation to a question that falls to be determined by the judge or jury, see B. McSherry,
‘Expert Testimony and the E¡ects of Mental Impairment: Reviving the Ultimate Issue Rule’
(2001) 24 InternationalJournal of Lawand Psychiatry 13.
76 [2004] 1All ER 725.
77 ibid at [178].
78 Add to this the fact that psychiatric assessments can take place long after the event in question and
are carried out by both the prosecution and defence psychiatrists at di¡erent times. See further
S. Morse, ‘Failed Explanations and Criminal Responsibility: Experts and the Unconscious’
(1982) 68 University ofVirginia Law Review 971, 1027, wherein Morse considers how the ‘measuring
tool changes from examiner to examiner’.
79 L. Blom-Cooper and T. Morris,With Malice Aforethought: A Study of the Crime and Punishment for
Homicide (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2004), 85^86.
80 J. Chalmers and F. Leverick,‘Fair Labelling in Criminal Law’ (2008) 71MLR. 217.
81 ibid 244^246.
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In any event, the concept of ‘fair labelling’ is freely used by the Law Commis-
sion in relation to diminished responsibility. Because the Commission would
have seen diminished responsibility having the e¡ect of reducing ¢rst degree
murder to second degree murder, it largely focussed on the notion of fair
labelling in the context of avoiding the word ‘murder’ for successful diminished
responsibility defences.82 However, it failed to deem anything unfair about the
label second degree murder in cases where the partial defence would apply.83
Time lapse and unconscious acquiescence has resulted in a dearth of considera-
tion being given to the term‘diminished responsibility’ itself, as a label. It is pro-
blematic in the sense that it is not amedical term.The title of section 52 retains the
concept of ‘persons su¡ering fromdiminished responsibility’, failing to acknowl-
edge that diminished responsibility is not in itself a condition which can be suf-
fered from, but is a legal de¢nition. This made more sense under the original
de¢nition where there was more £exibility in terms of permitting the plea in
cases where a strict medical condition did not exist.
Surprisingly, the body of section 52 has removed the term ‘responsibility’
entirely from the de¢nition of diminished responsibility, no doubt with the
intention of taking away those di⁄cult legal and moral arguments which the
word begets. In terms of fairness then, expanding on Gardner’s point discussed
above, it is unclear whether diminished responsibility refers to ‘basic responsibil-
ity’,84 or alternatively ‘consequential responsibility’, that is, ‘being held responsible
for what has gone amiss . . . I am consequentially responsible if some or all of the
unwelcome moral or legal consequences of some wrong or mistake (whether
mine or someone else’s) are mine to bear’.85 Gardner assumes that rational defen-
dants wish to avoid such responsibility ideally by justifying their actions, and fail-
ing that bymeans of excuse.86 This has a signi¢cant outcome for the defendant, as
exempli¢ed by Gardner in the context of the battered woman. He maintains that
such defendants want to avoid consequential responsibility, but not at the cost of
denying, or casting doubt on, their basic responsibility, which they wish to
assert.87 Thus, is the responsibility of the diminished responsibility defendant
82 LawCommissionReport (2006), n 5 above at [2.147]. Noteworthy is the fact that the Government’s
Consultation Paper on the same matter refers to the concept of fair labelling once only, in the par-
ticular context of developmental immaturity under diminished responsibility, Ministry of Justice
Consultation Paper (2008), n 21 above,17.
83 Law Commission Report (2006), n 5 above. Furthermore, the Commission puts this second to the
sentence mitigation principle (discussion of which is beyond the scope of this paper), since: ‘when
the o¡ender has killed with the fault element for ¢rst degree murder but pleads a ‘‘partial defence’’
successfully, he or she still ought to be convicted of an o¡ence of ‘‘murder’’ (second degree
murder)’, at [2.149].
84 That is,‘the ability to explain oneself, to give an intelligible account of oneself, to answer for one-
self, as a rational being. In short it is exactly what it sounds like: responseability, an ability to
respond’, Gardner, n 69 above,161.
85 Gardner, n 69 above,157. Gardner borrows the term from Dworkin; R. Dworkin, SovereignVirtue:
theTheory and Practice of Equality (Cambridge, Mass: HarvardUniversity Press, 2000) at 287.
86 For criticism of Gardner’s assertions see, N. Na⁄ne, ‘Moral Uncertainties of Rape and Murder:
Problems at the Core of Criminal LawTheory’ in B. McSherry et al (eds), Regulating Deviance:The
Redirection of Criminalisation and the Futures of Criminal Law (Oxford and Portland Oregon: Hart
Publishing, 2009) 213.
87 Gardner, n 69 above,161.
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reduced by reason of their inability to account for their conduct, or rather by vir-
tue of the fact that theirmental disorder hasmeant that they should avoid (in part)
the consequence of their wrongdoing?
Theweight being a¡orded to the term‘recognisedmedical condition’under sec-
tion 52 is representative of amarked shift towards the medicalisation of this area of
law. Of course there is support for such a move particularly from the psychiatric
community,88 but this deepening of the amalgamation of disciplines is curious
when we consider the time-honoured argument that, because the principles of
law and psychiatry are based on opposing paradigms, they cannot work together.
Both claim to have a monopoly on understanding human behaviour but, para-
doxically, appear to approach it from two di¡erent standpoints.89 Retaining the
legal term‘diminished responsibility’ in respect of a new law that has the e¡ect of
narrowing the defence to exclude anything that cannot be squeezed into a classi¢-
cation of a‘recognised medical condition’ is not only unfair in terms of labelling, it
does not do any favours for the Government’s goal of attaining clarity either.
Inextricably linkedwith notions of fairness and clarity is the overarching prin-
ciple of e¡ectiveness. E¡ectiveness, or being adequate to realise the purpose for
which a particular rule is implemented, goes to the heart of what the criminal
law is trying to achieve. In terms of the purpose of diminished responsibility,
the Law Commission pointed to a ‘single, prominent and endless refrain’ from
the responses to its Consultation Paper in 2003, to the e¡ect that: ‘the partial
defences of provocation and diminished responsibility have as their origin and
main purpose the protection of the defendant from the mandatory death/life sen-
tence for murder.’90 It adds that ‘[t]he huge discrepancy in sentence for a person
who succeeds, or fails, in those defences has generated pressures to expand those
defences.’91 Noteworthy, then, is the fact that section 52 has the potential to nar-
row the defence of diminished responsibility for certain groups of o¡enders, as
discussed above.
Another disappointment in terms of fairness is the failure of the new law to
address the existing statutory sentencing framework for murder on the grounds
that it is not directly relevant to governmental proposals and is outside the scope
of the review.92 It was argued that removing the mandatory life sentence would
allow mitigating features of homicide cases to be dealt with more easily without
resorting to‘gateways’ throughwhich a defendant can escape a murder conviction
in deserving but not undeserving cases.93 However, the Government’s response to
88 The Royal College of Psychiatrists supported this change, saying of the new de¢nition: ‘Overall
the e¡ect would be to encourage better standards of expert evidence and improved understanding
between the courts and experts.’ Law Commission Report (2006) at [5.114].
89 For discussion, see J. Hunter and J. Bargen,‘Diminished Responsiblity: ‘‘Abnormal’’Minds, Abnor-
mal Murderers andWhat the Doctor Said’ in S. M. H.Yeo (ed), Partial Excuses to Murder (Sydney:
The Federation Press,1991); A. Kenny, Freewill andResponsibility (London: Routledge &Kegan Paul,
1978); See S.T.Yannoulidis,‘Negotiating‘‘Dangerousness’’ : Charting a Course Between Psychiatry
and Law’ (2002) 9 Psychiatry, Psychology and Law 151; M. S. Morse, Lawand Psychiatry Rethinking the
Relationship (Cambridge University Press 1984).
90 Law Commission Report (2004), n 5 above at [2.59].
91 ibid.
92 Ministry of Justice, Summary of Responses and Government Position, (2009) n 25 above at [118].
93 ibid.
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this point was that the penalty for murder is an essential element in maintaining
public con¢dence in the criminal justice system and therefore something
which the Government wishes to maintain.94 Clearly, this area is in need of
further consideration in the context of the reform of diminished responsibility,
as many of the issues relating to the construction of the partial defences could
potentially be dealt with e¡ectively by giving more discretion in sentencing to
the judge in those cases where a partial defence is unsuccessful.
An examination of sentence mitigation is beyond the scope of this paper, suf-
¢ce it to say that most commentators would suggest that the very existence of the
doctrine of diminished responsibility is dependent upon the retention of the
¢xed penalty for murder, and that if the ¢xed penalty was abolished, diminished
responsibility could be dispensed with. However, further consideration is unli-
kely to be given to the abolition of the mandatory life sentence in light of the fact
that the Government started its review of the law of murder by reinforcing and
rede¢ning the remit of the partial defences.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
This paper identi¢es obscure phraseology and a lack of grounding in medical
diagnosis as the primary criticisms pertaining to the original de¢nition of dimin-
ished responsibility under section 2(1) of the HomicideAct 1957. It has considered
how the newde¢nition as set out under section 52 of the Coroners and JusticeAct
2009 has responded to such criticisms, while bearing in mind the Government’s
propounded values of ‘clarity, fairness and e¡ectiveness’.
Section 52 goes some way towards clarifying the law of diminished responsi-
bility. Most signi¢cantly, it de¢nes what amounts to ‘mental responsibility’ and
provides a medical basis for diagnoses under the section, with the introduction
of the ‘recognised medical condition’ criterion. However, unforeseen conse-
quences may lead to unfairness for certain categories of defendant, in light of the
narrowing e¡ect of the re¢ned de¢nition.
Fairness on a broader scale has also been considered. Deeper issues which go to
the heart of the defence itself both in practice (procedural fairness) and in theory
(fair labelling) need further consideration. It is unfortunate that the opportunity
was not taken at this time to reassess the concept and application of diminished
responsibility as a defence to murder from ¢rst principles, something which fell
beyond the remit even of the Law Commission.
From a structural perspective, this paper identi¢es the segmented means of
updating both the law of homicide and the law as it relates to o¡enders with a
mental disorder. Section 52 is adrift in an Act dedicated to a conglomeration of
issues, and su¡ers for it. It is regrettable that the opportunity to review the law in
this area in its entirety was not availed of, particularly as reformulation of the ori-
ginal de¢nition, although required, is not critical at this time.
94 ibid at [121].
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